| Castles, Battles, and Bombs: How Economics Explains Military History | 
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Avg. Customer Rating:   (based on 2 reviews)
Sales Rank: 171251
Category: Book
Authors: Jurgen Brauer, Hubert Van Tuyll
Publisher: University Of Chicago Press
Studio: University Of Chicago Press
Manufacturer: University Of Chicago Press
Label: University Of Chicago Press
Languages: English (Original Language), English (Unknown), English (Published)
Media: Hardcover
Number Of Items: 1
Pages: 424
Shipping Weight (lbs): 1.6
Dimensions (in): 9.1 x 6.3 x 1.3
ISBN: 0226071634
Dewey Decimal Number: 355.0273
EAN: 9780226071633
ASIN: 0226071634
Publication Date: May 1, 2008
Availability: Usually ships in 1-2 business days
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Product Description
From the walls of Troy to the sands of Iraq, humans have devoted staggering resources to the art and science of war. Yet while military history has long studied the economics of conflict, until now there have been few attempts to apply the principles of economics to military history. In Castles, Battles, and Bombs, Jurgen Brauer and Hubert van Tuyll reconsider key episodes of military history from the point of view of economics?with dramatically insightful results. For example, when looked at as a question of sheer cost, the building of castles in the Middle Ages seems almost inevitable: though stunningly expensive, a strong castle was far cheaper to maintain than a standing army. Similarly, great commanders of the Age of Battle such as Napoleon, Marlborough, and Frederick the Great are shown to have engaged in cost/benefit calculations: because the risk of losing of an entire army usually far outweighed the potential spoils of victory, they actually chose to fight relatively few large engagements. The authors also reexamine the strategic bombing of Germany in World War II and provide new insights into France?s decision to develop nuclear weapons. Drawing on these examples and more, Brauer and Van Tuyll suggest lessons for today?s military, from counterterrorist strategy and military manpower planning to the use of private military companies in Afghanistan and Iraq. Innovative and thought-provoking?and written to be grasped by readers without a background in economics?Castles, Battles, and Bombs opens up a new perspective on war and strategy, sure to fascinate history buffs, scholars, and students alike.
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| Customer Reviews:
 Interesting but overdone August 29, 2008
0 out of 1 found this review helpful
I had read a favorable review of this book in a publication I trust and ordered this book based upon that review. Military history is one of my spheres of interest and knowledge. I was quite disappointed. The author's theory is stretched to fit the topic.
 Economics Applied to Military History June 3, 2008
7 out of 8 found this review helpful
This pioneering work is not a military history narrative, though much of it there is, but the application of economic principles and theory to select socio-military developments in history, seeking to demonstrate the clarity of analysis the rigor of such application can bring to a field which seems to have hitherto lacked much formal structure. The famed WWI Schlieffen Plan (there's controversy about the extent to which the Germans actually implemented it fully, but the authors take it as given) provides the springboard for a discussion of opportunity costs (the real cost of X is the Y you are giving up by doing X) as applied to the strategic and operational choices in WWI to which are added the assymetries in information between combatants. The authors use the Schlieffen Plan analysis to introduce their methodology, a good and clear starting point because there is an actual war-making plan involved. Having thus established a an analytical template, they go back in history to medieval times and move forward with particularly interesting sections on the American Civil War, the strategic bombing campaign of Germany during WWII, France's decision to develop nuclear weapons, and, of contemporary interest but not really based on contemporary choices, the long history of "condottieri" (private contractors) to wage war ("provide security"). Afghanistan and Iraq are not covered as those theatres are still active, so it is premature to draw conclusions.
One learned in school that an objective of theory is to reduce variables to a meaningful few. This work is positing a template for military historiography (though, not an exclusive one). In the process, the authors are truly compelling in their advocacy of looking at war with the tools of economic analysis, for a simpler, keener understanding of the meaningful forces at work. Human suffering is indeed part of the calculus, as the section on WWII strategic bombing of Germany shows that, ironically, rather than demoralize the German volk into submission, all evidence points to it having stiffened resistance. Thus indeed what was intended as a strategic campaign in effect became a tactical one.
There is an introductory chapter on Economics explaining the concepts used. Each chapter has clear, useful matrices and charts througout the work summarizing the analysis applied. Readers unaquainted with Economics as a discipline ought not to be intimidated as the book is written for the general reader. And it is an engrossing read if history is an area of interest to you.
Unfortunately, whatever aggressive tendencies seem germane to humankind have had their most effective expression in waging war. It seems to be a lasting condition, however rationalized or just the cause. The analytical tools Messrs. Brauer and van Tuyll advocate increase our understanding of a regrettable but very real and probably permanent aspect of our existence. It may be opportune to also recommend Chris Hedges' "War is a Force That Gives us Meaning."
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