| Counterinsurgency in Modern Warfare (Companion) | 
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Avg. Customer Rating:   (based on 8 reviews)
Sales Rank: 98351
Category: Book
Publisher: Osprey Publishing
Studio: Osprey Publishing
Manufacturer: Osprey Publishing
Label: Osprey Publishing
Languages: English (Original Language), English (Unknown), English (Published)
Media: Hardcover
Number Of Items: 1
Pages: 304
Shipping Weight (lbs): 1.6
Dimensions (in): 9.2 x 6 x 1.3
ISBN: 1846032814
Dewey Decimal Number: 355.0218
EAN: 9781846032813
ASIN: 1846032814
Publication Date: April 22, 2008
Release Date: April 22, 2008
Availability: Usually ships in 1-2 business days
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Product Description
Through history armies of occupation and civil power have been repeatedly faced with the challenges of insurgency. US involvement in Iraq and Afghanistan has highlighted this form of conflict in the modern world. Armies, sometimes reluctantly, have had to adopt new doctrines and tactics to deal with the problems of insurgency and diverse counterinsurgency strategies have been developed. These have ranged from conventional military operations to a combination of military and political strategy including propaganda, Psy-Ops, and other approaches.
In Counterinsurgency in Modern Warfare 13 contributors examine developments in counterinsurgency from the early 20th century to the present. Each author, an expert in his field, discusses in depth the conduct and outcomes of operations across the globe, including the Arab-Israeli conflict, Afghanistan and Iraq, and draws out the lessons to be learned from them.
This book is a timely, serious yet accessible survey of a critical facet of modern warfare and present-day global conflict.
TOC
1. British Aid to the Civil Power: Ireland 1916-21 to Palestine 1948
2. US Operations in the Philippines 1898-1948
3. The Banana Wars
4. German Partisan Operations 1939-45
5. French Operations from Indo-China to Algeria: 1945-63
6. British COIN in Malaya 1948-60
7. US Operations in Vietnam
8. British Operations in Aden
9. British Operations in Northern Ireland
10. The Rhodesian Experience
11. Israeli Operations
12. Operations in Afghanistan
13. US and British Operations in Iraq
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| Customer Reviews: Read 3 more reviews...
 Good for the new student of counterinsurgent warfare October 6, 2008
The editors have put together an overview of counterinsurgent efforts in the 20th century with two final chapters on Afghanistan and Iraq. Although it's a great effort for the most part it's a bit uneven - something not unusual in compilations with a variety of authors. Where the book is weak is in those chapters that try to do too much in too few pages. For example, in the space of less than 20 pages the author writes about the British experience in Ireland, in the years leading up to its independence, and Palestine, both pre- and post-WW2. At the same time a chapter on the Philippines lumps together the US experience against the followers of Emilio Aguinaldo and, later, the Moros, and the government of the Philippines counterinsurgency during the Huk rebellion; again, too much within too little space. (And one chapter on the US experience in Nicaragua, 1909-1912, is by the author's own admission, not even about a counterinsurgency (p. 69).)
The book also would have been better served with a conclusion that pulled together many of the threads, and discrepancies that were identified throughout the book. For example, many of these insurgencies were, to use the cliche, wars of national independence. The examples of post-WWI Ireland, the US counterinsurgency in the Philippines, the French in Vietnam and Algeria, Malaya, and Aden are examples of a particular people winning their independence from an occupying power. It begs the question of what was the relationship between the insurgents' goal of independence vs. the success or failure of counterinsurgent strategies. At the same time, what were the differences between the conflicts addressed in these case studies that caused them to be different? For example, part of the British success in Malaya can be derived from the ethnic origins of the insurgent (Chinese) and the lack of access to outside suppliers, when compared to Vietnam where the French, and later the Americans, had to contend with borders across which the insurgents routinely received tons of supplies. Or, why were the Israeli's better at penetrating Palestinian groups vice the British? Or how did the geo-political context of the time impact the various counterinsurgent strategies?
Instead the book focuses on the already accepted "true-isms" of counterinsurgent warfare without much critical analysis; the book's introduction lists leadership, culture, the domestic political situation, and the gap between the government's aims and those of the insurgent as themes, but without much discussion, and it quotes the ideas of Colonel David Galula, Sir Robert Thompson and General Sir Frank Kitson as standards. But at no point do the editors attempt to synthesize the concepts and ideas generated by the book's case studies.
As for the two chapters on Afghanistan and Iraq - these chapters do a good job of summing up what has transpired and at the same time demonstrate that the US and its allies have learned their lessons, the hard way, as they have relearned how to fight insurgents. Of course, the chapters cannot address the variables that lead to success or failure because they are still ongoing conflicts.
However, there are some excellent chapters that focus on a particular counterinsurgency or an aspect of the effort. For example, the chapter on German anti-partisan warfare in the Soviet Union and France addresses the impact of ideology on its operations and strategy. At the same time the chapter on the British experience in Aden addresses the difficulty of dealing with several insurgent groups who are just as intent on killing each other as they are on fighting the central government, all within a post-WWII geo-political environment that saw a greatly diminished United Kingdom withdrawing from its colonies in the 1950s and 60s.
Overall I'm glad I bought the book, but then I have a keen personal and professional interest in counterinsurgent warfare so I have a real interest in keeping up with the literature. At the same time, the book would probably be a great historical primer for new students of insurgencies who are only interested in some top-line perspective before delving into the specifics of a particular war. However, for the most part, I'd recommend you get the book at the library.
An excellent overview of the recent history of counterinsurgency September 17, 2008
Counterinsurgency, once considered the poor sister or the "real" wars, in the past decades has become the most important activity for military forces around the world. This excellent book is a very good guide to understand the reason that stand behind the successes (rarely) and the failures (most frequently) of the most important counter insurgency campaign in the last two centuries.
The main lesson that can be learned from these campaigns is probably that no insurgency movement can succeed without the support of the civilian population. Winning the "hearts and souls" of the population becomes therefore the single most important goal of counterinsurgency. Counterinsurgency is not just a lower intensity version of a conventional war, but a whole different matter that requires radically different mentality, training and tools. All successful counterinsurgency operations (like the British in Malaysia, the Marines in the Philippines or the recent "surge" strategy in Iraq) were won by cutting both the internal (from the population) and external (foreign countries) support to the insurgents. Too many times counterinsurgency campaigns are focused on typical military objectives (enemies killed, bombing missions, etc.) that are important at a tactical level but completely irrelevant from a strategic point of view (think of body counts during the Vietnam war). Unfortunately, this requires a radical change in mentality that creates extremely strong resistance in the often conservative mind set of most military organizations (again, think of the US Army in Vietnam).
The book is structured as a collections of essay by different authors, with each chapter dedicated to a different campaign (including the ongoing wars in Iraq and Afghanistan). All the authors appear to be extremely qualified and knowledgeable, although the style sometimes could be more engaging and the some authors have a tendency (typical of academics) to focus too much on details at the expense of a more general analysis. Furthermore - perhaps inevitably, given the subject - a certain bias is evident in most chapter: I recommend to check out the biography of the different authors, before reading a chapter, to better understand their point of view.
Overall this is an excellent book for everybody interested in military subjects as well as for anybody who wants to better understand the recent events in Iraq and Afghanistan.
 Great historical review August 19, 2008
Drs. Daniel Marston and Carter Malkasian have put together a great review of different historical vignettes veering the last hundred years of modern warfare, highlighting the role of Counter Insurgency (COIN) in these efforts. Beginning with an outline of three of the leading lights in mid-twentieth century COIN theory, David Galula, Robert Thompson, and Frank Kitson, the various authors the editors brought together have brought to fore not only obvious candidates for study, such as the US in Vietnam, or the British in Malaya, but also the Germans on the Eastern front in World War II and whites in Rhodesia in the late 20th century.
Themes in these histories quickly emerge. The importance of unified efforts, i.e. civilian and military actions by counter insurgents coordinated, eliminating the discriminate use of force, the role of eliminating foreign sanctuaries. This book provides the reader with a great review of many of these issues and more.
I highly recommend this book.
A Great Textbook July 10, 2008
2 out of 2 found this review helpful
This is a GREAT book!! It should be on the required reading list of all western military officers. It is a must read for those who want to truly understand this "new warfare" as the Pentagon would say. However this book shows it isn't that new. This book is a collection of essays from various authors. Some of these authors are famous, some are not. The book flows very well. Each essay is entertaining in it's own way. The essays are heavy on the military approach, but it is a book on war. The essays tell the story of counterinsurgency from tales of campaigns in the last 50 years. This method is a great way to teach the principles of counterinsurgency. It is sort of like the Harvard Business school case method applied to military tactics.
If you are looking for an explanation of the complexities of each guerrilla campaign this book isn't for you. The authors give you a broad overview then they get down to the lessons learned from the conflict. The reader can more easily pick up the concepts by seeing historical example than reading about it from a dry textbook.
As you read this you will understand the Iraqi stories much better. You also will also see how there is a light at the end of the tunnel for Iraq. After much pain it seems that the Army is heading on the right path. It also shows how dealing with counterinsurgency is much more complex than just killing the enemy. You have to fix the under lying reasons for the conflict to begin with. If you don't killing thousands of the Army just leads to tens of thousands taking their place.
A fine choice for any serious military library. June 20, 2008
4 out of 4 found this review helpful
Insurgency, terrorism and bloodshed have resulted in counter insurgencies ranging from military operations to politics, but successful strategies are often forgotten in the aftermath of war. The authors here gather a history and strategic commentary on the nature and effectiveness of counterinsurgency doctrine from early times to modern. Conflicts are outlined along with the strategies that proved successful, making Counterinsurgency in Modern Warfare a fine choice for any serious military library.
Diane C. Donovan
California Bookwatch
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